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NOTES
MOTION PICTURE COPYRIGHT*
In this age of commercial enterprise it seems strange that
legal writers have largely ignored the application of copyright
law to motion pictures which constitutes one of its most interest-
ing and financially important phases. Despite the fact that the
motion picture industry is the largest user of copyrighted mate-
rials in the world1 and that its two billion dollar investment
makes it the fourth largest business in the United States,2
statutory provisions relating to motion pictures have been al-
lowed to remain in inadequate status. The phenomenal growth
of the motion picture industry suggests consideration of its posi-
tion in respect to the law of copyright in the United States.
It is the purpose of the present article to review briefly the
factors and authorities influencing this phase of the law. Con-
sideration will be made of the basic problems encountered, with
particular reference to the statutory and judicial bases for copy-
righting motion pictures, the formalities required, the exclusive
rights secured and infringement of such rights, the remedies
afforded for infringement, -and recent statutory reforms pro-
posed for the copyright law.
I. COPYRIGHT STATUTES
Before considering the basic problems, it is desirable to re-
view the present status of motion pictures under the existing
Copyright Act 3 based upon Article I, section 8, of the Constitu-
tion which provides that Congress shall have the power:
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by se-
curing for limited times to authors and inventors the ex-
clusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
The Act of 1909 made no mention of motion pictures. This
omission was made despite the fact that Edison had invented
the motion picture machine twenty years previously, 4 that Eng-
* This is a condensation of the paper which won the 1940 Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition and is printed with permission of the American So-
ciety of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1. Shafter, Musical Copjright (2d ed. 1939) 349.
2. There's Always a Catch; Once it was Sound, now Color (Dec. 7, 1935)
6 News Week 36.
3. (1909) 35 Stat. 1075-1088, c. 320, 17 U. S. C. A. secs. 1-63, amended
(1912) 37 Stat. 488-490, 17 U. S. C. A. secs. 5, 11, 25.
4. The "Kinetoscope" was invented on Oct. 6, 1889.
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lish statutes had already recognized "cinematography," 5 and
that federal courts had passed upon the copyrighting of motion
pictures. The first of the cases, involving an early form of news-
reel, held that such a "motion picture" could be copyrighted as a
photograph, under the Copyright Act of 1865.6 The court said
that to require individual copyrights for each picture "would,
in effect, be to require copyright of many pictures to protect a
single one."
This doctrine was further developed in subsequent cases." In
reviewing early controversies over the copyrighting of motion
pictures, the judiciary soon departed from the doctrine that
courts by interpretation should not extend existing statutes to
subsequent inventions, but should leave such matters to the legis-
lative body for determination. These cases are the first examples
of extensions by judicial construction in the existing copyright
law, since all the previous decisions had adhered strictly to the
statutes.8
This trend toward judicial legislation was further developed
in Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co.,9 wherein it was held that a film
was a "writing" under section 4 of the Act of 1909. The word
"writings" was extended to include moving pictures, because
they tended to reproduce an artist's visual conception of an
author's ideas described in words. The court's reason for this
new extension of the word was that a motion picture film tends
5. In England, at the time the Act of 1909 was passed, cinematographic
films were entitled to copyright protection just as were all other photo-
graphs. Barker Motion Photography, Ltd. v. Hulton & Co., Ltd. (1912) 28
T. L. R. 496, 56 Sol. J. 633. The English Copyright Act of 1911 provided
that, in the case of a literary or dramatic work, "copyright" should include
the sole right to make "cinematograph film, or other contrivance by means
of which the work may be mechanically performed or delivered." (1911)
1 and 2 Geo. V. c. 46, sec. 1 (2). "Cinematograph" was defined as includ-
ing any work "produced by any process analogous to cinematography." Id.
at sec. 35 (1).
6. Edison v. Lubin (C. C. A. 3, 1903) 122 Fed. 240, 241, 242. In dis-
cussing the question of whether, when the negative was photographically
reproduced, the reproduction was a photograph, the court said: "The mere
circumstance that such positive is pictured on a strip of celluloid, and not
on a strip of paper, is immaterial. In either event, the reproduction is a
light-written, and therefore a photographic plate or photograph." Id. at 242.
7. American Mutoscope & Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co. (C. C. D.
N. J. 1905) 137 Fed. 262, 266, where the court said, "Though taken at
different points, the pictures express the author's ideas and conceptions
embodied in the one story." See also: Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co. (C. C.
A. 2, 1909) 169 Fed. 61.
8. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dist. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co. (D. C. D.
Mass. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 908, 910.
9. (C. C. A. 2, 1909) 169 Fed. 61.
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to promote the progress of science or the useful arts as set forth
in Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States.
Judicial legislation was again employed to sanction the copy-
righting of motion pictures under section 1 (d). This section
confers upon the copyright proprietor "the exclusive right to per-
form or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a
drama." Ka/em Co. v. Harper Bros.10 held the unauthorized ex-
hibition of a motion picture based upon the dramatization of a
copyrighted novel was a dramatic production, and that conse-
quently the copyright in the novel was infringed. But the ques-
tion whether a film is itself to be deemed a drama did not arise
until Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Bijou Theatre
Co.,1 The court therein found that the words "to make * * * any
transcription or record" in section 1 (d) included the production
of a motion picture photoplay; and it was of the opinion that this
section protects films based on dramas or other dramatic com-
positions which are already copyrighted under other appropriate
sections of the Act. It concluded that a motion picture photoplay
was a drama under the Act and that its unauthorized presenta-
tion or exhibition was therefore prohibited.
The development of sound pictures in the late 1920's intro-
duced a new element into the field of motion picture copyright-
the mechanical reproduction of music, dialogue, and other audi-
tory impressions by recording on the edge of the film itself 12 or
on a record which is synchronized with the projection of the
film.13 The latter method, although mechanically more simple,
has caused greater controversy. The picture producers who use
this process have claimed that, except as to use, their recordings
are analogous to ordinary records. 4 Under this interpretation
a talking picture recording would be considered a mechanical
reproduction, copyrightable per se.'5 This problem, however, has
never been taken to the courts for solution, but a tacit under-
standing has been reached recognizing a talking picture as being
a single organism rather than a combination of separable parts."
10. (1911) 222 U. S. 55, Ann. Cas. 1913A 1285.
11. (C. C. A. 1, 1932) 59 F. (2d) 70, setting aside (D. C. D. Mass.
1931) 50 F. (2d) 908.
12. Technically known as the "Movietone" method, the edge of the film
called the "sound track."
13. The "Vitaphone" process.
14. This contention was made in a controversy over licensing fees in an
effort to pay only the two-cent royalty on music. Shafter, op. cit. supra.
note 1, at 350.
15. See 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 1 (e).
16. Shafter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 350.
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Amendment of 1912
The Act of 1912, amending the Act of 1909, specifically pro-
vided for the copyrighting of motion pictures by the addition of
two new classes of copyright works, 7 namely, "(1) Motion-
picture photoplays," and "(m) Motion-pictures other than photo-
plays." The amendment included18 directions for the deposit of
a certain number of prints from the scenes, acts, or sections of
each motion picture to be copyrighted; and provided 9 for
limited damages in the case of infringement of nondramatic
work by means of motion pictures. The latter applies in case
the infringer shows that he was not aware of infringement or
that he could not reasonably have foreseen it.
The express authority to copyright "motion picture photo-
plays" having been established, they may be registered either as
published or as unpublished works.2 0 The Copyright Office, in
classifying motion pictures, refers only to the general categories
mentioned in the statute and makes no mentioned of newsreels,
sports events, or similar cinematic works. In drawing up film
contracts, the term "photoplay" is intended to include all kinds
of films from "shorts" to feature pictures.2 1 It is now established
that pictures based on dramas or on dramatizations of literary
and dramatic productions are "photoplays" and, being dramatic
in nature, their protection is assured.2 ?
The amendment of 1912 specifically authorized "motion pic-
tures other than photoplays" to be copyrighted even when un-
published . 2  The reason for making a differentiation between
motion picture photoplays and motion pictures other than photo-
plays has been explained on the basis that
* * * the former is the result of an intellectual effort com-
bined with technical skill; to produce the latter only the
technical skill is needed. The former is therefore given by
the Act a higher degree of protection as a dramatic work.2 4
While this provision for copyrighting motion pictures other than
17. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 5.
18. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 11.
19. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 25.
20. Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman (C. C. A. 2, 1914) 218 Fed.
577, affirming (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 212 Fed. 301; Photo-Drama Motion
Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1915) 220 Fed. 448.
21. Shafter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 73-74.
22. Tiffany Prod. v. Dewing (D. C. D. Md. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 911; Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Dist. Co. v. Bijou Theatre Co. (D. C. D. Mass. 1933) 3 F.
Supp. 66.
23. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 5.
24. Copinger, Copyright (5th ed. 1911) 251.
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photoplays might seem to be broad enough to include animated
cartoons, it was perhaps intended merely to distinguish be-
tween dramatic and non-dramatic films, in the same manner as
the English copyright statute.25 No decision has ever defined the
types of film included in this class but in all probability trav-
elogues, newsreels, documentary films, and disconnected shorts
would belong here.26
II. REQUIREMENTS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
There must be acts of publication in order to copyright a
motion picture,2 7 but these acts are largely analogous to those
effecting publication in the more familiar case of stage produc-
tions. In the United States, only a general and authorized textual
publication of a dramatic piece is understood to dedicate the
literary property therein to the public ;28 merely giving a public
exhibition is not considered as being such a dedication. 2 9 Publi-
cation of motion pictures takes place when there is a showing
of the film to the trade and available copies are offered for sale.30
Accordingly, reproduction of the picture in "positive" films made
from original "negative" film and the sale and distribution
of "negative" copies is a publication. 31 One case 32 held that the
sale of a motion picture film, even without a "running-off," was
a publication, but this decision was subsequently overruled by a
25. (1911) 1 and 2 Geo. V. c. 46, sec. 35 (1), where it is provided that
the phrase "dramatic work" shall include "any cinematograph production
where the arrangement or acting form or the combination of incidents
represented give the work an original character."
26. Marchetti, Law of Stage, Screen and Radio (1936) 147. Generally,
the courts have avoided the issue as to where to draw the line of demarca-
tion in the case of motion pictures. Tiffany Productions v. Dewing (D. C. D.
Md. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 911; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dist. Co. v. Bijou
Theatre Co. (D. C. D. Mass. 1933) 3 F. Supp. 66, (C. C. A. 1, 1932) 59 F.(2d) 70, rev'g (D. C. D. Mass. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 908; Pathe Exch. v.
International Alliance (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1932) 3 F. Supp. 63. One court
has made the illogical statement that mere exhibition of a non-dramatic
motion picture constitutes a dramatization of such non-dramatic work with
no regard to the content of the work. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dist. Co. v.
Bijou Theatre Co. (D. C. D. Mass. 1933) 3 F. Supp. 66.
27. Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 212
Fed. 301, 303, aff'd (C. C. A. 2, 1914) 218 Fed. 577, 134 C. C. A. 305.
28. O'Neill v. General Film Co. (1916) 171 App. Div. 854, 157 N. Y. S.
1028.
29. Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp. (C. C.
A. 2, 1915) 220 Fed. 448; Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman (C. C. A.
2, 1914) 218 Fed. 577.
30. 2 Ladas, International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property
(1938) 695, sec. 322.
31. Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936) 850.
32. Universal Film Co. v. Copperman (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 212 Fed.
301.
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case which treated the sale as only a performing license which
did not dedicate the common law rights in the drama as repre-
sented by the scenario. 33
By an unusual interpretation of the law, a differentiation is
made between leasing copies of a film and of a printed publica-
tion; leasing the former is held not to be a general "publica-
tion."3 It has been suggested that since leasing of books to the
public has always been regarded as a publication, leasing of
copies of a film should also constitute publication.
3 5
One of the most recent problems of publication has resulted
from the constant use of songs and other music in talking pic-
tures. It has been suggested that the use of a song in a sound
picture should have virtually the same effect as that resulting
from its performance in any other manner.36 Such performance
ordinarily does not constitute a publication.37 But the production
of a musical composition in a "talkie" has been distinguished
from its projection upon the screen, and has been looked upon
as a copying and publication of the work itself.3 8 An additional
question of musical publication arises when a non-copyrighted
film including a song is published by the sale of the copy. The
question presented is this: 3 "Would the abandonment include
the song?" Inasmuch as the sale of copies is undoubtedly a pub-
lication, the song would thereafter be in the public domain.40
Registration and Deposit. Section 11 of the amendatory Act
of 1912, relating to the copyrighting of unpublished works not
reproduced for sale, provides for the deposit of copies of motion
pictures. When copyright protection for a "motion-picture
photoplay" is sought, a title and description, with one print
taken from each scene or act of the picture, must be deposited
with the claim of copyright ;41 if for a "motion picture other than
a photoplay," a title and description, with not less than two
33. Universal Film Co. v. Copperman (C. C. A. 2, 1914) 218 Fed. 577.
34. De Mille Co. v. Casey (1923) 121 Misc. 78, 201 N. Y. S. 20.
35. 2 Ladas, op. cit. supra note 30, at 695, sec. 322.
36. Shafter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 116.
37. Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1934) 8 F.
Supp. 196.
38. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dist. Corp. v. Wyatt and Maryland Yacht
Club (D. C. Md., Eq. no. 1969, 1932).
39. Shafter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 116.
40. Ibid.
41. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 11; Rules and Regulations for Registrations of
Claims to Copyright, Copyright Office Bull. No. 15, rule 22. Publication
before the copyright is registered invalidates the copyright. Universal Film
Mfg. Co. v. Copperman (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 212 Fed. 301.
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prints taken from different sections of the complete motion pic-
ture, must be so deposited.42
No corresponding amendment was made, however, to section
12 which requires the deposit of "two complete copies" of pub-
lished works. The courts have completely disregarded the phrase-
ology of this section by holding that the deposit requirement for
registration of published motion pictures should be the same as
that for unpublished motion pictures.4 3
Copyright Notice. The requirement of notice has undergone
transformation since the early days of the motion picture in-
dustry when the fact of copyright registration had to appear in
every scene.44 At present sufficient notice of copyright is given if
a plate inscribed with the statutory notice is attached to the
film.45 Customarily, the fact of registration is exhibited upon the
screen at the beginning of the picture. This notice no longer
need be repeated where a film is arbitrarily divided for con-
venience into reels, even though these reels are independent of
each other and can be shown separately.-
Notice of the year of copyright registration is required only
in the case of copies of printed literary, musical, or dramatic
works ;47 and motion pictures are not included in these categories.
It is advisable, however, to add the year of registration as a
precautionary measure.
Application for Copyright. Under the copyright law of the
United States, "the author or proprietor : * *, or his executors,
administrators, or assigns" are entitled to protection. 48 The
owner of the negative at the time of the making of the film is
the author of a motion picture film. In the case of a non-dramatic
work, the author is the sole holder of copyright,4" but in the
42. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 11; Rules and Regulations for Registration of
Claims to Copyright, Copyright Office Bull. No. 15, rule 22.
43. Patterson v. Century Prod. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 30.
44. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 29, 1939, p. 2F: 1, where Walter
Winchell made the following statement, based on an illustration in 1 Ram-
saye, Million and One Nights (1926) opposite 296: "Film piracies were
numerous in the early silent days, and each company put its trademark on
a prominent object in each scene to prevent theft by competitors. Some-
times the identifying symbol -was on a door, a wall or a tree. In a newsreel
of the Corbett-Fitzsimmons prizefight at Carson City, Nev., in 1897, the
copyright was painted on the side of the ring platform."
45. Edison v. Lubin (C. C. A. 3, 1903) 122 Fed. 240, where the court
held that one marking was enough, since the motion picture was essentially
a single photograph.
46. Patterson v. Century Prod. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 489.
47. 17 U. S. C. A. secs. 9, 18.
48. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 8.
49. 1 Ladas, op. cit. supra note 30, at 463, sec. 215.
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case of a dramatic work other persons may possess authorship.50
Here the courts have recognized ownership of copyright by the
producer of the film in his capacity as employer of the scenario
writer and of the stage director, or in his capacity as assignee
of independent creators.- Thus, one deriving title from the
author is known as the "proprietor" of the work. He can claim
the right only where the author is entitled to the benefit of copy-
right.5 2
Duration and Renewal. Initial rights secured by copyright
are limited to twenty-eight years from the date of the first publi-
cation, 51 but a renewal may be obtained for another twenty-eight
year period, making the maximum duration of protection fifty-
six years."
III. RIGHTS SECURED BY COPYRIGHT
Briefly, the exclusive rights secured by copyright consist of:
(1) the right to print, publish, and vend; (2) the right to trans-
form; (3) the right to perform publicly; and (4) the right to
assign any of the aforementioned.
(1) Publication. The exclusive right of the copyright owner
"to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted
work" affords protection against copying after the first publica-
tion, a practice which existed under the common law.50 "Print-
ing" and "reprinting" refer to multiplication and issuance of
copies of films. 57 "Publishing" is the communication to the public
of the work, or any part thereof.8 "Copying" includes substan-
tial and exact reproductions.5 "Vending" means the transfer of
title in a film for a consideration; it includes distribution by
means of sale, resale, lease, etc. 0 But by transferring title the
vendor loses his power to restrict the use of the picture.61
50. Ibid.
51. 1 Ladas, op. cit. supra note 30, at 462, see. 215.
52. Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 769.
53. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 23.
54. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 24.
55. 17 U. S. C. A. see. 1 (a). Harms v. Cohen (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1922) 279
Fed. 276.
56. Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith (C. C. A. 8, 1913) 204 Fed. 398.
57. For brief explanation of producing films, see Mutual Film Corp. v.
Industrial Comm. of Ohio (1915) 236 U. S. 230, 234; Pathe Exch. v. Cobb
(N. Y. 1922) 202 App. Div. 450.
58. 2 Ladas, op. cit. supra note 30, at 778, sec. 360.
59. Lawrence v. Dana (C. C. D. Mass. 1869) 15 Fed. Cas. 26.
60. Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell (1913) 229 U. S. 1, 13.
61. Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 212
Fed. 301, aff'd (C. C. A. 2, 1914) 218 Fed. 577.
NOTES1940]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss4/8
562 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
(2) Transformation. The power of the copyright owner to
transform62 includes the right to convert copyrighted work into
other forms of "writings" which, in turn, may be copyrighted.
Thus the scenario and the photoplay made therefrom may be
copyrighted separately. In addition to several stage dramatiza-
tions of a novel, each individually copyrightable, other dramati-
zations intended for use on the screen might be copyrighted.63
A motion picture may be transformed into a novel or a drama."
Recently complications arose when the law was required to
take cognizance of talking picture rights. The courts have taken
notice of the fact that "the talking motion picture combines the
pictorial element of the old silent pictures with the new element
which was formerly inseparable from dramatic rights, viz., the
audible reproduction of words." 65 Hence they have extended
copyright protection to include a transformation of a novel or a
drama for purposes of talking picture production.
(3) Performance. The copyright owner has an exclusive right
to make any transcription or record for performance or exhibi-
tion including the production of photoplays which may be in-
fringed by an unauthorized exhibition." Since there may be sev-
eral dramatizations, the grant of performing rights in the
dramatic version of a novel does not include the right to make a
different dramatization of it.67 The right to perform publicly
would be infringed by performance of an unauthorized dramatic
version of the novel.68
(4) Assignment. Through the exercise or assignment of his
rights, the author can produce, or have produced, derivative
works6 9 which will in turn be capable of individual copyright.70
To effectuate the provisions regarding constructive notice in the
62. 17 U. S. C. A. secs. 1, 6.
63. Photo Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp. (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1914) 213 Fed. 374; Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman(C. C. A. 2, 1914) 218 Fed. 577, 134 C. C. A. 305.
64. See Fitch v. Young (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911) 230 Fed. 743, where the
exclusive right to novelize a drama was recognized. Although no decision
has been found to substantiate the novelization of a motion picture, it is
assumed that on analogy it would be sustained.
65. Cinema Corp. of America v. De Mille (N. Y. 1933) 149 Misc. 358,
359, 267 N. Y. S. 327.
66. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Bijou Theatre Co. (C. C. A. 1, 1932) 59 F.(2d) 70.
67. Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1909) 169 Fed. 61.
68. Ibid.
69. National Picture Theatres v. Foundation Film Corp. (C. C. A. 2,
1920) 266 Fed. 208.
70. Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Co. (C. C. A.
2, 1915) 220 Fed. 448.
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recording section of the Act, the assignment of such rights must
be recorded.71
The answer to the question "Does the grant of the rights of
dramatization include that of making motion pictures?" is gen-
erally procured through judicial construction of the contract. In
most cases whether the parties intended to contract in regard
to the stage rights alone will not be a difficult question. It is a
matter of common knowledge that screen rights to a literary
work are frequently more valuable than stage rights. Unless the
agreement clearly shows such an intent, the copyright owner
will not be presumed to include screen rights with the grant of
stage rights.
The Act of 1909 expressly provided for assignments,72 and
licenses are permitted by implication.73 Intention of the con-
tracting parties 74 determines whether a grant by a copyright
owner or proprietor is an assignment or a license-i. e., whether
all or only a portion of the grantor's rights will be included.
Some courts construe contracts transferring film production
rights liberally.75 But the majority of the courts by strict inter-
pretation hold that particularization will exclude all unmentioned
rights,76 unless the grant is so phrased that the parties appar-
ently had in mind more than the spoken drama.77 Under this
view a grant of stage production rights will not include film
rights.78
With the development of sound pictures, a question also arose
whether the phrase "exclusive motion picture rights" included
"talking motion picture rights." This was answered in the af-
firmative in the federal courts by L. C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film
Corp.79 although "talkies" were unknown when the agreement
was consummated. The court found that inventors had been ex-
71. Ibid.; Macloon v. Vitagraph (C. C. A. 2, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 634.
72. 17 U. S. C. A. see. 41.
73. See Tully v. Triangle Film Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1916) 229 Fed.
297; Klein v. Beach (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1916) 232 Fed. 240.
74. 2 Ladas, op. cit. supra note 30, at 780.
75. Frohman v. Fitch (1914) 164 App. Div. 231, 149 N. Y. S. 633; Lipzin
v. Gordin (1915) 166 N. Y. S. 792; Hart v. Fox (1917) 166 N. Y. S. 793.
76. Harms v. Stern (C. C. A. 2, 1915) 229 Fed. 42; Klein v. Beach(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1916) 232 Fed. 240; Harper Bros. v. Klaw (D. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1916) 232 Fed. 609; Manners v. Morosco (1920) 252 U. S. 317. See
Comments (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 705, 69 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 74.
77. 2 Ladas, op. cit. supra note 30, at 780.
78. Manners v. Morosco (1920) 252 U. S. 317; O'Neill v. General Film
Co. (1916) 171 App. Div. 854, 157 N. Y. S. 1028; Underhill v. Schenck
(1921) 114 Misc. 520, 187 N. Y. S. 589.
79. (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 196.
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perimenting with sound in motion pictures and, although the
author had not contemplated sound when executing the contract,
the words used were sufficient * * * to embrace not only
motion pictures of the sort then known but also such techni-
cal improvements in motion pictures as might be developed
during the term of the license, * * * "talkies" are but a
species of the genus motion pictures, * * *.so
It appears likely that similar results will be attached to such
new developments in the motion picture industry as technicolor,8'
three-dimensional projection,82 and television.8'
Effect of Copyright Upon Common Law Rights
Courts have long followed the rule that performance of a
dramatic work on the stage does not extinguish the author's
common law rights therein ;84 this rule has been extended to
protect the author when a motion picture is exhibited.,, Where,
however, there is copyrighted a motion picture adapted from an
unpublished drama, common law rights in the latter are aban-
doned in respect to all events and scenes drawn therefrom and
shown in the picture, but not in respect to the unused portions.8
Even if motion picture films are sold, the common law rights
in them are not transferred or abandoned ;87 the theory is that
the sale is intended to convey only the right to exhibit, not the
right to re-enact or re-film the original photoplay. Moreover, if
films are leased, the lessor retains an exclusive right to give
public exhibitions on the ground that the lease is not a dedica-
tion of this common law right.88
80. Id. at 199.
81. See Technicolor May Revolutionize the Screen (June 8, 1935) 119
Literary Digest 24-25; Becky Sharp in Color May Open Movies' Third Era
(June 22, 1935) 5 News Week 22-23.
82. See Three Dimension Movies Arrive (Dec. 12, 1936) 122 Literary
Digest 30.
83. See Daugherty, Movies Woo Television (Dec. 22, 1937) Christian
Science Monitor Magazine 3; Hurd, Hollywood's Opportunity: What Will
Television Do to the Movies? (July 1, 1938) Christian Science Monitor
Magazine 8; Wittenberg, Protection and Marketing of Literary Property
(1937) 5, says: "Even now, the purchasers of literary material for motion-
pictures are seeking to acquire television rights, anticipating its commercial
adaptability." See Televising Old Films, A Legal Complication (Nov. 18,
1939) 137 Motion Picture Herald 16.
84. Ferris v. Frohman (1912) 223 U. S. 424, 435.
85. DeMille Co. v. Casey (1923) 121 Misc. 78, 201 N. Y. S. 20.
86. O'Neill v. General Film (1916) 171 App. Div. 854, 157 N. Y. S. 1028.
87. Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman (C. C. A. 2, 1914) 218 Fed.
577.
88. De Mille Co. v. Casey (1923) 121 Misc. 78, 201'N. Y. S. 20.
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NOTES
IV. INFRINGEMENT
Suits for infringement of copyright usually revolve about two
major issues: first, the existence of copyright in the original
work and, second, the infringement of this right by copying.8 9
The problem is to discover a standard of judgment whereby the
existence of plagiarism can accurately be determined. Some
years ago a book called The Science of Playwriting° presented
formulae designed to aid in the dissection and analysis of char-
acters, emotions, and plots. This "method" obtained judicial
attention but not recognition. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corporation,"9 the court refused to use the formulae, stating
that: "the more the court is led into the intricacies of dramatic
craftsmanship, the less likely is it to stand upon the firmer, if
more naive, ground of its considered impressions upon its own
perusal.1112
Judges have usually rejected expert testimony, preferring
to rely upon their own impressions and observations,93 and the
ability of an ordinary observer to detect copying in the allegedly
infringing work.94 However, the question of infringement is not
left to the layman where certain technicalities of law are in-
volved, such as the scope of copyright protection.9 5
Infringement by Motion Pictures. In deciding whether a copy-
righted novel or drama has been infringed by the publication of
a film version of the novel or drama, a number of cases have held
that the production of a motion picture is not an infringement
of the copyrighted novel or drama, because the physical film is
not considered a copy of the protected works.98 One court has
looked upon the public showing of a film as being a photographic
display, but not as an infringement of the rights of publication. 9T
89. Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1937) 17 F. Supp.
816.
90. See Wittenberg, Protection and Marketing of Literary Property
(1937) 69.
91. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 145, aff'd (C. C. A. 2, 1930) 45
F. (2d) 119.
92. Id. at 45 F. (2d) 119, 123.
93. Id. at 122.
94. Barbadillo v. Goldwyn (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 881;
Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer (C. C. A. 9, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 1; Caruthers
v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 906. See
Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1937) 17 F. Supp. 816,
where the court admitted that expert testimony is helpful.
95. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1934)
7 F. Supp. 837.
96. Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1909) 169 Fed. 61; Kalen"
Co. v. Harper Bros (1911) 222 U. S. 55, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1285.
97. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros. (1911) 222 U. S. 55, 62, Ann. Cas. 1913A,
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The exhibition of a motion picture, however, is construed as a
dramatic version of the novel and as an infringement of the
copyright owner's exclusive rights to dramatize and to perform
publicly.,8
With the advent of sound motion pictures, music became
not only a featured attraction, but also incidental background
for dialogue and action. The industry has found itself confronted
by an efficient organization protecting the performing rights of
copyrighted music. Dramatists and novelists, who negotiate in-
dividually, have been unable to cope with the organized film
producers. But music composers and publishers, through affilia-
tion with the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers,"9 have competently defended their interests. As
guardian of the performing rights of its members, this Society
has successfully attacked the unlicensed use of its compositions
in "talkies" on the ground that such use is a performance of
music for profit in violation of the copyright law.
Infringement of Motion Pictures. Infringement of a copy-
righted novel by a motion picture production should be dis-
tinguished from the infringement of a copyrighted motion pic-
ture, since a ruling upon the first question is not decisive of the
second. 110
Just as in other copyright, motion picture films may be in-
fringed through the multiplication or sale of copies. 0' Beyond
this, the extent to which there may be infringement of moving
picture films is difficult to define. This situation is largely due
to the fact that the statute confers the exclusive right to per-
form, represent, or exhibit for dramatic and musical works only,
but fails to confer any such specific rights for motion pictures.102
However, since a moving picture photoplay may be deemed
dramatic work,103 the holder of copyright in a motion picture
1285, where the Court drew a distinctTon between a mere photograph and
moving pictures.
98. Harper Bros. v. Kalem Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1909) 169 Fed. 81; Kalem
Co. v. Harper Bros. (1911) 222 U. S. 55, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1285.
99. This cooperative endeavor has given ASCAP control of over 3,000,000
compositions. Shafter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 311.
100. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dist. Co. v. Bijou Theatre Co. (D. C. D.
Mass. 1931) 50 F. (2) 908, set aside on other grounds (C. C. A. 1, 1932)
59 F. (2d) 70.
101. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 1. Patterson v. Century Productions (C. C. A. 2,
1937) 93 F. (2d) 489.
102. 17 U. S. C. A. see. 1. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Bijou Theatre Co.
(C. C. A. 1, 1932) 59 F. (2d) 70.
103. Tiffany Productions v. Dewing (D. C. D. Md. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 911;
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dist. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co. (C. C. A. 1, 1932)
59 F. (2d) 70, rev'g (D. C. D. Mass. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 908. See Comment
(1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 380.
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photoplay possesses an exclusive right of public performance.
The public exhibition of a competing film production infringes
this exclusive right.'0  An unauthorized exhibition of a copy-
righted motion picture would constitute a dramatization, infring-
ing the right of performance, 105 under the view that motion
picture photoplays come within section 1 (d) of the Act of 1909,
relating to the making and performing of transcriptions or
records of dramatic works.'0°
Titles. The courts have frequently protected the title of a
copyrighted literary or artistic work, but have done so only in
connection with the work and never independently of it."0 The
title will be protected when it has acquired a "secondary mean-
ing" in relation to the work or when its use in connection with
another work would confuse the public."°8 In the latter case the
composition must have attained such publicity or notoriety that
the public has established a definite association between the title
and the work in question. 0 9
V. REMEDIES
Varying remedies are provided for violations of the rights
conferred upon the copyright owner by the statute. Violation of
the exclusive right to copy may be remedied by damages,110
issuance of an injunction,"' or by an accounting for profits."
The injunction is not used more than is absolutely necessary"11
and its value for the purpose of restraining the infringement of
motion picture films may be doubtful. This is due to the fact
that before a temporary injunction is made final the actual value
of the picture may drop to nothing due to shifting popularity of
104. Ibid. It is not necessary that the unauthorized exhibition be for
profit to constitute infringement. Pathe Exch. v. International Alliance
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1932) 3 F. Supp. 63.
105. Tiffany Productions v. Dewing (D. C. D. Md. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 911;
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dist. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co. (D. C. D. Mass.
1933) 3 F. Supp. 66.
106. 17 U. S. C. A. see. 1 (d).
107. Warner Bros. v. Majestic Pictures (C. C. A. 2, 1934) 70 F. (2d)
310. See Wittenberg, op. cit. supra note 90, at 110.
108. Manners v. Triangle Film Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1917) 244 Fed.
293.
109. Patten v. Superior Talldng Pictures (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1934) 8 F.
Supp. 196.
110. 17 U. S. C. A. see. 25 (b).
111. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 25 (a).
112. See infra notes 119 et seq.
113. See Brady v. Reliance Motion Picture Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1916) 229
Fed. 137; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dist. Corp. v. Fisher (D. C. D. Md. 1935)
10 F. Supp. 745; L. C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1936)
83 F. (2d) 196.
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the "stars." An injunction will seldom be made permanent"1'
because the defendant is generally given sufficient time to elimi-
nate the infringing portions of his film production, and so only
a "moral" victory is obtained. Therefore, parties injured by an
infringement usually attempt to obtain more tangible compensa-
tion.
The issue of damages for infringement is complicated by the
poor draftsmanship of section 25 of the Act, which sets out
available remedies. This section provides that damages are to
be limited to a maximum of $100 in case the infringer shows
that he was not aware that the motion pictures constituted in-
fringement of an undramatized or non-dramatic work, and that
such infringement could not reasonably have been foreseen. 15
It further stipulates that damages of a minimum of $250 to a
maximum of $5,000 may be awarded where the motion picture
infringes a dramatic or dramatico-musical work. Actual dam-
ages and profits are usually combined and sought in one action;
and the plaintiff may recover either or both.110 The measure of
actual damages is the probable amount of sales lost due to the
competition of the infringing work.11 7 But due to uncertainty
and difficulty in estimating this amount, suits at law are usually
designed to recover maximum damages under the statute."28
The bill in an accounting for profits is governed by the general
principles of equity and is not allowed as a matter of right."0
Until recently the rule was that all profits from an infringing
work were subject to the person whose work had been in-
fringed.120 But a precedent-breaking departure was recently
made in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,22' where it
114. See International Film Service Co. v. Affiliated Dist. (D. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1922) 283 Fed. 229.
115. In order to apply the maximum limitation of damages, the in-
fringer must show that he was not aware of his act of infringement.
Patterson v. Century Productions (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 30.
116. Shafter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 257. See Note (1939) 24 WASHING-
TON U. LAW QUARTERLY 400.
117. Paramore v. Mack Sennett (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 66.
118. See Tiffany Productions v. Dewing (D. C. D. Md. 1931) 50 F. (2d)
911.
119. McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp. (C. C. A. 5, 1924) 299 Fed. 48.
3,20. E. g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1934) 7 F. Supp. 837.
121. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1938)
26 F. Supp. 134, aff'g (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 81 F. (2d) 49, rev'g (D. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 837. See Comment (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 688;
Notorious Lady (Aug. 5, 1939) 136 Motion Picture Herald 8; 20% of
Profits for Plagiarism; Exhibitor Customers May be Sued, Ibid.; Court
Denies Application for 'Lynton' Rehearing (Sept. 9, 1939) 136 Motion
Picture Herald 60; Court Cuts Award in 'Lynton' Suit (Sept. 23, 1939) 136
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was held that profits from an infringing film are to be appor-
tioned according to the value actually contributed by the plagi-
arized story. This decision has been appealed to the Supreme
Court ;12 its final dispensation is expected to clarify this phase
of the law.
The Act specifies certain other remedies, such as the delivering
up 12 and the destruction of"2 infringing copies, and provides for
costs and attorney's fees to the prevailing party.12 5 Where the
allowance of full costs is in question this provision is considered
mandatory,"1- but, where the plaintiff is only partially successful,
the court may exercise its discretion by apportioning costs be-
tween the parties.127 The court also has considerable discretion
in the allowance of attorney's fees.2 8 If the ward appears rea-
sonable and proportionate to the work required, the novelty of
the question, and the amount of money involved, it will be upheld
upon appeal. 2 9
VI. THE "SHOTWELL BILL"
In 1909 and 1912 it was impossible for Congress to anticipate
the incredible technical and financial growth of the motion pic-
ture industry. The task of applying the copyright law with due
consideration for these changes has consequently devolved upon
the courts. Difficulties experienced in practice are not due to
deficiencies of the judiciary but to the incomprehensiveness of
the copyright statutes.'" The Act of 1909 and the amendatory
Act of 1912 have become antiquated methods of dealing with
the great demand of motion picture producers for copyrighted
literary and musical works.
Motion Picture Herald 56. The value which the licensee of the copyright
put on his rights is immaterial. L. C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp. (C. C.
A. 2, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 196.
122. MGM Copyright Case Before Supreme Court (Nov. 11, 1939) 137
Motion Picture Herald 52. [Since this article was written the Supreme
Court has refused to review the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. (1940) 60 S. Ct. 263.-EDITOR.]
123. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 25 (c). See Patterson v. Century Prod. (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 30.
124. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 25 (d). See Patterson v. Century Prod. (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 30.
125. 17 U. S. C. A. sec. 40.
126. Pastime Amusement Co. v. Witmark & Sons (C. C. A. 4, 1924)
2 F. (2) 1020.
127. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1938) 26 F. Supp. 134.
128. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1930) 45 F. (2d)
119; Eisman v. Samuel Goldwyn (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 519.
129. Caruthers v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937) 20
F. Supp. 906; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1938) 26 F. Supp. 134.
130. Shafter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 87.
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Perhaps the outstanding needs to be filled by revision of the
copyright law are the inclusion of a wider range of protected
works and a more stringent guardianship of all copyrighted
objects. The "Shotwell Bill"'131 has been drafted to strengthen
both qualitatively and quantitatively the protection bestowed by
the law on literary, musical, and other artistic products. In-
corporation in the copyright statute of the changes suggested
by this proposal would serve as stimuli to the production of all
types of copyrightable compositions.
Some of the more significant aspects of the proposed enact-
ment will be noted. The second section of the bill would estab-
lish an "automatic copyright" by declaring that "authors shall
have copyright in all of their writings, whether published or
unpublished from and after the creation thereof, without com-
pliance with any conditions or formalities." This section is in
realfty a statutory version of the so-called common law copy-
right, which has been altered to prevent the loss of common law
rights upon publication. Also, the bill would abolish the am-
biguities in the vital question of publication. If this section
should be enacted, any original work produced thereafter would
immediately be protected.
The protection afforded the author of a copyrighted musical
composition would be greatly extended by other provisions in
this bill. Section 4 (e) provides that a copyright of a motion
picture "shall not include the right of public performance for
profit of any musical composition which is a part of a motion
picture when the right of public performance for profit shall be
owned by others." In addition, section 4 (h) provides that "a
copyright in a motion picture shall not include the right to grant
the use of its accompanying sound track apart from a visual
exhibition of the motion picture."
Section 6 of the "Shotwell Bill" would extend the period of
copyright protection from the present maximum of fifty-six
years to a term covering the author's lifetime plus an interval
of fifty years thereafter or, where the author or first owner is
other than a natural person, to fifty years following the creation
of the work. Such a provision would guarantee to writers of
dramatic and musical works a more substantial and secure finan-
cial status.
Section 8 provides that "the Author of a work shall be the
first owner of copyright therein." This provision, of course,
131. This bill is being sponsored by a committee under the chairmanship
of Dr. Shotwell.
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expresses the attitude of the authors.132 The motion picture
industry has voiced its most vehement objections to this section
of the bill. Motion picture producers are of the opinion that the
employer should be regarded legally as the author of any works
produced by its employees. Diametrically opposed to this view,
the Authors' League of America has strongly protested that
"where copyright initiates upon the creation of the work, the
transfer of the right to motion picture producer can be handled
by contract," and that the legal fiction of looking upon the
employer as the author is quite unnecessary. The League argues
that no such fiction exists under the analogous patent laws. It
points out that the inventor is the only one who is granted the
privilege of patenting his invention. His employer, however,
can specify in the contract of employment with the inventor that
any patents procured by the latter shall be assigned to the em-
ployer.
Another section of the proposed act provides for a consider-
able broadening of copyrightable subjects. Heretofore, "motion
pictures" have been protected by implication as "dramatizations"
rather than by specific provision. The "Shotwell Bill" entitles
such pictures to a place quite as important as "dramatic" and
"dramatic-musical" compositions.233 It further provides for the
desirable classifications of "scenarios and continuities for motion
pictures"'' 3 and for "sound" pictures.135
Section 49 of the bill authorizes the President "to take all
steps and to perform all acts necessary to make the United States
an adhering party" in the International Copyright Union. Mem-
bership in this organization is most desirable in view of the
importance of our country as a producer of motion pictures for
the world entertainment market. Entrance into the Union would
entitle all Americans protected under United States copyright
law to automatic protection in more than forty important for-
eign countries. 136
CONCLUSION
This paper has pointed out the more important phases of
motion picture copyright. It has been shown that troublesome
problems have arisen because of the inadequacy of the present
132. The writer is indebted to Mr. John G. Paine, General Manager of
ASCAP for the discussion of the views expressed here. Letter to this
writer, Nov. 14, 1939.
133. Sec. 15 (d).
134. Sec. 15 (j).
135. See. 15 (k).
136. For a list of the 44 members of the Union, see Shafter, op. cit. supra
note 1, at pp. 478-479.
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law. Although most of these questions have now become settled,
new and more involved ones are coming forth with the intro-
duction of color, the third dimension, and television in this field.
It is therefore apparent that the "Shotwell Bill" should be given
serious consideration in order that the benefits of past experi-
mentation may be enjoyed and the "period of fumbling" in copy-
right litigation be ended. The clarification of the many confused
issues which yet await logical settlement would permit and even
induce a continuation of the rapid growth of the motion picture
industry. There would undoubtedly be a consequent increase in
the value of all literary and musical works possessing any sub-
stantial potentialities as material for use in future productions.
Thus, all parties concerned-authors, composers, publishers,
producers, distributors, exhibitors, and also consumers-would
be directly or indirectly benefited by the adoption of the "Shot-
well Bill."
MILTON H. ARONSON.
THE JOINT TORT-FEASOR IN MISSOURI
The gradual change in the concept of tort liability made of the
tort-feasor a new man. At early common law, the liability of the
tort-feasor was to a large extent imposed as a penalty for his
wrongdoing." If two or more were liable for the tort, any or
all might be held to pay. And, according to Mei-ryweather v.
Nixan,2 those upon whom a levy was made could not enforce con-
tribution by the others. Today, tort liability is no longer imposed
as a penalty. Its purpose is to shift the burden of loss caused
by tortious conduct to those who may be properly required to
bear it. With this change in concept there came a feeling that
the rule denying contribution between joint tort-feasors operated
too harshly in many situations. Nevertheless, the majority of
jurisdictions which have not modified the rule by statute still
deny any right to contribution between joint tort-feasors. 3 Some
1. Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors (1936) 21
Corn. L. Q. 552, 554. Pollock, The Law of Torts (13th ed. 1929) 4: "In
the medieval period the procedure whereby redress was obtained for many
of the injuries now classified as torts bore plain traces of a criminal or
quasi-criminal character, the defendant against whom judgment passed
being liable not only to compensate the plaintiff, but to pay a fine to the
king."
2. (K. B. 1799) 8 T. R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337.
3. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 552; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity be-
tween Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 130, 141.
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